one more thing

I wanted to add one more note on why the question about the nature of aesthetic and moral acts is important. Traditionally, to be sure, there has been an overwhelming bias for moral acts. Hitherto, moral acts have been considered to be the paradigmatic acts (that are indicative)of a moral agent. Indeed, it's this very bias that Nietzsche's criticisms and revaluations are directed, and he is certainly right to question this historical bias.

At any rate, why do moral acts have such an elevated status--especially over aesthetic acts? Aesthetic acts have usually been rendered as preferential acts--something that, in no way, any moral agent is obligated to do (when have you heard any moralist tell you that aesthetic acts ore obligatory?). Aesthetic acts have been considered to be a kind of ab extra or "acts of fancy"--they are certainly not necessary, but "rather nice if fancy doing them." I certainly think this bias is mistaken; and it is especially mistaken if aesthetic and moral acts are one and the same.

As you all know, I find any kind of preference or bias given to any kind of activity over aesthetics activities detestable and confused. Maybe I'm wrong? What do you all think? I want to say that the aesthetic person, the aesthetic life, is the highest form and realm of existence; the aesthetic life is the most meaningful kind of existence, the highest participation in the "Good"--which, of course, is also inevitably a (or: the--) moral life.

Aesthetic and Moral Acts

I've been thinking about the nature of aesthetic acts and moral acts. And, naturally, a lot of interesting questions begin to surface when you think of the relation and difference between the two. For instance, do all moral acts have aesthetic qualities or properties? Or, conversely, do all aeshetic acts have a kind of moral quality?

In the Birth of Tragedy, Neitzsche says that utimately the higher kind of acts will be aesthetic acts. He also says that the world and existence (of all kinds) are justified by aesthetics and not morality. I'm not sure if Nietzsche is right here (surprising, I know)--that is, after thinking about Plato's conception of the "Good", I'm beginning to think that aesthetic and moral acts are one and the same. Here's what I mean by this. Let's suppose that Plato is right (and maybe this won't set well with you all): That is, the highest kinds of acts are going to be those that are grounded in , or manifest, the "Good." But the "Good"--as you all know--is 1) intrinsically good, 2) the form that makes all other good things good insofar as those things manifest or instantiate the "Good", and 3), the most interesting part found in Plato's Symposium, the "Good" is beautiful—-and anything that is good for Plato and Aristotle, intrinsically good, is also beautiful, and true.

So, what does this mean? I am proposing that, strictly speaking, aesthetic and moral acts are one and the same thing. Someone might then ask: Is the “Good” good qua the “Good” or qua beautiful. The answer, I should think, is that it is both—-for they’re the same.

At any rate, what do you all think? I can’t remember if any of you are anti-Platonists or not. If you’re an anti-Platonist, then you need not respond here because obviously your opinion is severely misguided for several reasons (see below*); but, if you aren’t an anti-Platonist or any nonsense of that sort, then lets have some dialogue and let everyone here know what you think!

Lastly, if aesthetic and moral acts are one and the same, then this is kind of problematic for me because that would mean Nietzsche is a bit off. But, wait! Dear readers! Don’t go off worrying quite yet! I’ve been thinking of why Nietzsche made such a distinction, and I think—-after some research and conversations with my Uber-Nietzschean friend—-I’m beginning to understand why Nietzsche had to make that distinction. In all seriousness, obviously he wouldn’t make such a blundering mistake like that! Come on! It’s fucking Nietzsche!


* 1) Your opinion is misguided because it doesn't manifest the "Good".
2) Plato says that opinions are in the metaphysical realm of shit because it is not true knowledge--opinions don't really count for much.
...and no, 1) and 2) do not beg the question against anti-Platonists.


what?