one more thing

I wanted to add one more note on why the question about the nature of aesthetic and moral acts is important. Traditionally, to be sure, there has been an overwhelming bias for moral acts. Hitherto, moral acts have been considered to be the paradigmatic acts (that are indicative)of a moral agent. Indeed, it's this very bias that Nietzsche's criticisms and revaluations are directed, and he is certainly right to question this historical bias.

At any rate, why do moral acts have such an elevated status--especially over aesthetic acts? Aesthetic acts have usually been rendered as preferential acts--something that, in no way, any moral agent is obligated to do (when have you heard any moralist tell you that aesthetic acts ore obligatory?). Aesthetic acts have been considered to be a kind of ab extra or "acts of fancy"--they are certainly not necessary, but "rather nice if fancy doing them." I certainly think this bias is mistaken; and it is especially mistaken if aesthetic and moral acts are one and the same.

As you all know, I find any kind of preference or bias given to any kind of activity over aesthetics activities detestable and confused. Maybe I'm wrong? What do you all think? I want to say that the aesthetic person, the aesthetic life, is the highest form and realm of existence; the aesthetic life is the most meaningful kind of existence, the highest participation in the "Good"--which, of course, is also inevitably a (or: the--) moral life.